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BAD MACHINES CORRUPT GOOD MORALS
Abstract
Machines powered by Artificial Intelligence (AI) are now influencing the behavior of
humans in ways that are both like and unlike the ways humans influence each other. In light of
recent research showing that other humans can exert a strong corrupting influence on people’s
ethical behavior, worry emerges about the corrupting power of AI agents. To estimate the
empirical validity of these fears, we review the available evidence from behavioral science,
human-computer interaction, and AI research. We propose that the main social roles through
which both humans and machines can influence ethical behavior are (a) role model, (b) advisor,
(c) partner, and (d) delegate. When AI agents become influencers (role models or advisors), their
corrupting power may not exceed (yet) the corrupting power of humans. However, AI agents
acting as enablers of unethical behavior (partners or delegates) have many characteristics that
may let people reap unethical benefits while feeling good about themselves, indicating good
reasons for worry. Based on these insights, we outline a research agenda that aims at providing
more behavioral insights for better AI oversight.
Keywords: machine behavior; behavioral ethics; corruption; artificial intelligence
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Although people generally prefer to behave ethically1, they face many temptations to break
rules for private benefits2, especially when these ethical violations are facilitated by other
individuals3, who may be advisors, delegates, or active cooperation partners. Given that Artificial
Intelligence (AI) agents (see Box 1 for our use of this term) increasingly act in advisory,
delegation, or cooperation roles4,5, should we fear that AI may exert a corrupting force on human
ethical behavior?
BOX 1: What do we not mean by “AI agents”?
AI encompasses various techniques in computer science (e.g., machine learning) that allow for
the autonomous execution of tasks that used to be reserved for humans6,7. Because of this
autonomy of execution, some instantiations of AI-powered technology are commonly referred to
as AI agents8, and we will adopt this terminology in the current manuscript. It is important to
note, however, that using the term "AI agent" should not carry any presupposition that the AI can
be held morally or legally responsible for the outcomes of its tasks9. While liability issues can
become complicated when AI technology increases in sophistication10, our default stance in the
article is that humans (e.g., programmers, designers, users) are always ultimately responsible for
the behavior of AI agents and its consequences11.
Of course, any new technology can be used for unethical purposes by savvy criminals, and
such is the case for AI. For example, scammers made use of AI to create hyper-realistic
deepfakes defrauding companies, with the damage in one single case amounting to over
$220,00012. AI can also tempt honest citizens into unethical behavior by merely making cheating
easier. For example, students have successfully used powerful Natural Language Generation
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(NLG) algorithms to craft their essays13. Finally, even if AI does not directly offer the means to
cheat, it may still give inappropriate advice or provide an example of inappropriate behavior.
Consider how traders might imitate manipulative market strategies from algorithmic traders14, or
that by now, many adolescents seek guidance on ethical dilemmas from their personal AI
assistants or chatbot friends15. With more than 100 million people using AI-powered personal
assistants like Siri or Alexa, the potential for such an inappropriate influence cannot be ignored.
The trajectory of powerful AI tools quickly becoming widely accessible triggers fear and
worry16. For example, a recent report by the EU commission highlights that “citizens (...) worry
that AI can have unintended effects or even be used for malicious purposes”17. Yet, such
pessimistic views about new technologies are nothing new18. People have felt threatened by
machines for centuries19, and tend to meet innovations with exaggerated skepticism6 and
fear-mongering. Developing a cool-headed policy agenda requires an evidence-based assessment
about which of the fears that AI will corrupt human ethical behavior are warranted20. Put
differently, developing effective AI oversight requires an overview of available empirical
insights.
A growing literature in behavioral science examines how humans corrupt each other, yet
research on how intelligent machines affect human ethical behavior remains scant. Based on a
review of current findings on the human social forces shaping (un)ethical behavior, we identify
four main roles through which AI agents might exert a corrupting force on human ethical
behavior: (a) role model, (b) advisor, (c) partner, and (d) delegate. We critically evaluate the
potential severity of the AI agents’ corrupting force for each of these roles. Based on the
identified gaps in knowledge, we sketch a research agenda on how interacting with and through
AI agents affects human ethical behavior.
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How can people and AI agents corrupt ethical behavior?
Unethical behavior is commonly defined as “acts that have harmful effects on others and are
either illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community”21, based on 22. Behavioral ethics
investigates how people behave when faced with the temptation to act unethically and, in
particular, how they weigh the personal benefits and risks of such behavior23–26, either in a
material sense (e.g., financial gains, legal punishment) or a psychological sense (e.g.,
self-image)27–31. Meta-analyses of individual forms of unethical behavior 1,32 (situations in which
people face temptations by themselves) indicate that people generally break ethical rules only to
the extent that they can justify it1,32. The behavioral research we will focus on is concerned with
the power of social forces shaping (un)ethical behavior3,33–35,for a meta-analyis, see 36, that is, the
corrupting influence people can have on other people. Likewise, there is ample research on the
harm that AI agents can themselves inflict37, for example, by reproducing biases38,39,  fostering
internet addiction40,41, or accelerating the spread of false information42; but the research we will
focus on is concerned with the way AI agents can perform social roles that make people harm
each other. We now review in turn four such social roles (See Fig. 1 for a summary).
Fig. 1. Illustration of the main roles through which humans and AI can corrupt human ethical
behavior, grouped along the left panel for AI in the role of an influencer (role model & advisor)
and along the right panel for AI being an enabler (partner & delegate). Boxes summarize the
main fears and mechanisms attached to each role. Color coding indicates the strength of the
corrupting force of AI, either not reaching human levels yet (green), reaching but not surpassing
human levels (yellow), and surpassing human levels (red).
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Role Model
When deciding whether to break or adhere to ethical rules, people often consider what others
would do to gauge the normative standards of the particular situation43. Social norms theory
outlines that such perceptions fall into two main categories: Injunctive norms convey information
about whether a particular course of action is considered acceptable and descriptive norms
outline whether a behavior is deemed to be widespread44–46. Experimental research reveals that
such normative perceptions in general, and perceived descriptive norms in particular, strongly
influence unethical behavior as people often imitate others. Put differently, when perceiving that
others break versus adhere to ethical rules, people often follow suit 2,47,48,for a review see 49.
In the digital world, people are exposed to both human and machine behavior4. A machine
that would display unethical or inappropriate behavior may therefore shift people’s perception of
what is acceptable or appropriate. There is only mixed evidence (and negative on balance) that
adult humans might conform to machines the same way they conform to humans, though, and
this evidence is restricted to non-moral behaviors50–55.
Note that even if people were shown not to conform to machine role models, the possibility
would remain for them to be influenced by machines passing as humans online56,57; for example,
when online traders imitate manipulative trading strategies that, unbeknownst to them, are
executed by algorithmic traders14. There is concerning evidence that children, more than adults,
may be influenced by machine role models52, in a way that makes them change their perception
of moral transgressions58,59. Overall, though, the current state of experimental evidence would
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suggest that machines acting as unethical role models are less of a concern than humans acting in
the same capacity.
Advisor
People can have a more direct corrupting influence than role-models when giving advice to
act (un)ethically. Behavioral research has established that people do tend to follow advice and
orders, particularly when they come from authority figures60, see replication 61. Advisors who have a
vested interest in an unethical course of action may encourage advisees to act unethically, and
research shows that such advice may lead advisees to break ethical rules, especially if they can
benefit from this behavior themselves62,63.
AI agents may follow persuasive goals41,64, such as giving advice and recommendations65.
This trend of AI agents swaying people’s behavior is only increasing. In fact, Amazon’s chief
scientist Rohit Prasad remarked that people’s relationship with their Alexas “keeps growing from
more of an assistant to advisor”66. In parallel to home assistants, millions of users engage with
advice-giving conversational agents like Replika (replika.ai), trained on large amounts of data
reflecting personalized preferences67. Companies like Gong (Gong.io) use NLP and machine
learning to analyze big data of recorded sales conversations in order to provide advice to
salespeople about how to improve their performance. Given the difficulty of training AI advisors
to be impartial moral guides37,68, however we define this standard, their personalized advice
could lead people to break ethical rules. This concern is compounded by the fact that people may
feel “algorithmically dumbfounded” by AI advice, in the sense that they may be complacent to
follow it, even if they anticipate its (ethical) shortcomings69.
Are these fears warranted? Even if machines were to give unethical advice, a phenomenon
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which has yet to be documented, we know that people state that they are not necessarily keen on
following algorithmic recommendations in non-technical domains70,71. While this aversion could,
in theory, dampen the effect of unethical machine advice, recent evidence from a large-scale
experiment tells a different story72. This experiment directly compared the effect of human and
AI advice on people’s actual (un)ethical behavior - not their stated preferences. The results
revealed that AI and human advice exerted an equally strong corrupting effect on people’s
willingness to break ethical rules for profit. These initial findings suggest that we should take
seriously the possibility that humans may act based on corrupting advice from AI agents, as
seriously as we take the possibility that humans may receive and follow corrupting advice from
other humans.
Partner
People can be corrupted by unethical advisors, but they can also corrupt each other,
becoming partners in crime3,34. This happens when two or more individuals act together toward a
mutually beneficial outcome, realize that this outcome can be achieved through unethical means,
and collaborate in these unethical means26,33. Behavioral research shows that people are more
likely to act unethically in these collaborative conditions than when they face temptations
alone3,34. Besides people having a general tendency to conform to others73,see for a replication 74, another
reason for the appeal of collaborative corruption is that the salient, positive effect of helping one
another can overshadow the negative impact of harming some third-party43,75. This skewed
balance facilitates justifications for unethical behavior29,33. Furthermore, partners in crime can
deflect blame on one another, which is even easier if one was not the one to initiate the unethical
act (e.g., it is much easier to passively accept a bribe than to actively request one76–78).
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Humans have long cooperated with machines79–81. As the machine partners become
“smarter” and their behavior less predictable, research is shifting from mostly looking at the
physical relationships between humans and machines towards understanding their
socio-cognitive relationships80,82,see for a review 83. As a testimony of this trend, thanks to recent
breakthroughs in machine learning, algorithms now can establish and sustain cooperation with
humans across multiple strategic situations57,84. Hence, we may be concerned that they collude
with them and break ethical rules for mutual benefits, just as machines may engage in
algorithmic collusion among themselves85–87. Since there are few behavioral insights into
unethical behavior in hybrid human-machine teams88, much of this section is speculation.
First, we do not know the extent to which people might strategically deflect blame on their
machine partners in crime. What we do know is that when people team up with machines, the
machines can be seen as sharing the responsibility for negative outcomes89, both by their human
partners90 and by third parties91. Having said that, humans still see themselves as primarily
responsible for the outcomes when they cooperate with relatively simple machines92,93.
Third-party observers similarly attribute less blame to AI agents compared to humans if a hybrid
team violates moral norms94. These results suggest that people may be cognitively disposed to
deflect at least some blame onto machines when they engage in joint unethical behavior with
these machines.
Second, we do not know the extent to which people might frame joint unethical behavior
with machines as mutually beneficial75, since it is not clear whether people think of machines as
experiencing some form of utility95. What we do know is that people show less mentalizing brain
activity when cooperating with machines (compared to humans)96, which suggests that they are
de-emphasizing the ‘mental states’ of the machines97, including its experienced utility. People
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also experience less emotional and social responses when interacting with machines83,98,99, which
could be a double-edged sword: this muted response could make it harder to frame the unethical
act positively100 — as a mutually beneficial win-win situation — but it could also facilitate
unethical behavior by weakening feelings of guilt99.
Other factors may prove even more critical. For example, although some have recommended
drawing on automated, and ideally incorruptible, whistleblowing machines101, we do not know
yet how much people will fear that the machine may denounce them or blow the whistle if they
initiate or accept unethical cooperation. Given the prevalence of human-human corrupt
collaboration and our sizable uncertainty about its human-machine version, future research needs
to give it serious consideration.
Delegate
Besides active partners, others can also serve as delegates to whom people can outsource the
execution of unethical behavior. When people face the choice between breaking ethical rules
themselves versus letting others do so on their behalf, they generally prefer delegation102. Acting
through others can entail explicit instruction to break ethical rules, such as when using
henchpersons. Yet, more often than not, people do not explicitly instruct the delegates to break
ethical rules but instead merely define their desired outcome and turn a blind eye to the
modalities of achieving this goal. Thereby, the remitter avoids direct contact with the victims and
can willfully ignore any possible ethical rule violations102,103. Moreover, if inflicted harm
becomes apparent, blame and responsibility can be deflected to the delegate, which alleviates the
guilt experienced.
People also delegate a growing number of tasks to AI agents5,104,105, as diverse as setting
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prices in online markets86, interrogating suspects106, or devise a sales strategy107. New forms of
ethical risks emerge because the delegation of ethically questionable behavior to AI agents might
be particularly attractive108: The often-incomprehensible workings of algorithms create
ambiguity109,110. Letting such “black box” algorithms execute tasks on one’s behalf increases
plausible deniability10,106, and obfuscates the attribution of responsibility for the harm caused111.
On top of that, when entrusting machines to execute tasks that cause potential harm, victims
generally remain psychologically distant and abstract112.
One key consequence of these dynamics is that in many cases, people may cause harm
without explicitly knowing so because they only specified a goal they wanted to achieve and left
the execution to an algorithm37 — for example, one may use algorithmic prices to sell goods on
online markets, without being aware that algorithms might coordinate and set collusive prices85.
Those employing AI interrogators might merely specify the desired result of a confession
without explicitly preventing the AI agent from threatening torture106. Marketers drawing on
AI-power sales strategies might blind themselves to the fact that the AI agent employs deceptive
tactics to reach the sales goals.
But AI can also be of use for those who explicitly intend to do harm10,113,114. Recent
developments in deep learning, particularly Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), have
massively facilitated the production of fake content that appears realistic114. Employing such AI
hench-agents bears key advantages for those with malicious intent: AI can act autonomously115
and has the power to strike with unprecedented effectiveness116. Furthermore, such AI
hench-agents are typically scalable117 and leave little to no breadcrumb trail back to the original
initiator of the wrongdoings10,118. For example, AI-powered deepfakes allow forging identities119,
and thereby put phishing attacks on new, i.e., a more personalized level of spear phishing113,
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which boosts the effectiveness of the attacks116.
Reflecting on this emerging worry, a panel of experts has nominated deepfakes as the most
dangerous tool for AI-enabled crime114. Soon their use could exceed the scam and cyberwarfare
contexts and become an attractive tool for ordinary citizens. Consider, for example (online) shop
owners, who outsource the task of writing fake reviews to NLG algorithms, or political
competitors, who use deepfakes to sully the reputation of their rivals120.
Delegating tasks to AI agents rather than to humans combines most factors conducive for
unethical behavior: anonymity121, psychological distance from victims122, and
undetectability112,123. While people are hesitant to outsource tasks to static algorithms105, recent
studies show that delegating tasks to AI agents rather than a person reduces the remitters
(negative) emotional reactions124. These studies suggest that letting algorithms do the “dirty job”
of breaking ethical rules for profit on one’s behalf likely reduces people’s remorse and guilt.
Thereby, reasons to worry exist that algorithmic delegation could contribute to well-intended
people doing bad things, often without realizing it. Although not explicitly instructed to, AI
delegates might neglect ethical rules when executing such tasks37,125. On top of that, AI agents
become an increasingly attractive tool for those who have the intention to advance selfish goals,
acting as a hench-agent on one’s behalf14. Soon not only scammers but everyone from high
school students, over business owners, to disgruntled ex-partners could be tempted to use AI to
engage in such delegated forms of unethical behavior.
AI as an influencer versus enabler
Examining the fears about the corrupting force of AI reveals a key difference between
cases when AI agents themselves are actively involved in the ethical behavior or not. When they
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are not, such as when acting as a role model or advisor, AI agents become influencers that target
people’s moral preferences. In these roles, available evidence suggests that AI agents do not yet
exceed humans in their ability to change what people consider right and wrong. However, when
it comes to the scale of influence, such AI agents’ abilities vastly exceed those of humans. That
is, even though AI agents do not significantly surpass humans in their abilities to corrupt ethical
behavior on a single occasion, their aggregate influence can be worrisome117. Consider the vast
effect that AI has by enabling “personalized mass persuasion”41. AI recommender systems can
slightly nudge consumers to purchase products that create harmful consequences for others14.
Even if AI agents succeed at a low rate on a given occasion, overall, they might lead to a
non-negligible shift towards more unethical behavior when employed widely. The subtle
influence of AI agents might, in aggregate, have a substantial effect on human unethical
behavior.
When AI agents are actively involved in unethical behavior — as partners and delegates
— they become enablers that allow people to act based on their (selfish) preferences. AI agents
offer the dangerous trifecta of opacity, anonymity, and social distance that enables people to
psychologically dissociate themselves from the unethical act. That is, people often deceive
themselves to achieve the dual goals of behaving self-interestedly, but at the same time retain the
belief that their moral standards are upheld126. They frequently let moral concerns fade into the
background and seek to obscure the moral implications of their behavior, a process that can
occur without conscious awareness127. AI enablers amplify this trend, likely more than human
enablers do, and thus potentially increase people’s ethical blind spots128, a trend that warrants
concern and, more importantly, empirical scrutiny.
How to gain behavioral insight for better oversight?
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A pressing demand exists for behavioral insights into how interactions between humans
and AI agents might corrupt human ethical behavior10. Such research programs need to be
grounded in both computer science and social science129–131. Studies using hypothetical scenarios
(“what would you want the algorithm to do?”) and self-reported data (“how do you rate the
algorithm’s decision?”) have produced valuable insights into people’s stated preferences132–134.
However, little empirical knowledge exists on how dynamic human interactions with and
through AI agents can cause unethical behavior. Experimental research that treats AI as
autonomous agents — similar to how social science treats humans — can help draw causal
inferences into the potentially corrupting effects of AI on human ethical behavior4. Adopting
such a behavioral ethics approach to AI will provide a better understanding of its potential to
promote ethical behavior, and help to design evidence-based policies that reduce the corrupting
risks of AI20,135.
First, we need more experiments that directly compare the magnitude of AI-induced
corruption versus human-induced corruption. This article outlined several social roles that human
and AI agents can play in corrupting human ethical behavior. We note that these roles are
somewhat archetypical, that they may overlap, that they might not capture every form of
influence (e.g., interactions with chatbots may disinhibit people to engage in harmful discourse
136,137), and that the shift from one to the other may be a matter of degree. However,
differentiating between these roles helps to identify their unique corrupting powers. Due to the
lack of experimental work that directly pits human against AI agents in these different roles,
assessing the fears about AI’s corrupting force largely relies on extrapolating from research on
humans corrupting humans. Previous research has compared the behavior of humans, who play
economic games with humans, to the behavior of humans, who play economic games with AI
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agents57,84, but these tasks mostly lack a clear ethical component. The next step would be to
conduct experiments in which humans face the temptation to behave unethically and can be
pushed in that direction by AI agents acting as role-models, advisors, partners, or delegates —
and to assess whether such AI agents can surpass the corruptive influence of other humans, by
which magnitude, and in which role.
Running experiments on unethical behavior can raise practical and ethical challenges of
its own. Many forms of unethical behavior, like corruption, are typically hidden from plain sight,
rendering the search for valid proxies challenging138. Researchers who themselves introduce
unethical behaviors in field experiments face warranted concerns from a research ethics
perspective139. Overcoming these challenges requires adopting creative means to obtain
behavioral data on unethical behavior from the field23,140,for a review see 141 or running experiments
using behavioral tasks of unethical behavior in the lab or online1,32. The estimates obtained in
such controlled environments correlate with unethical behavior in the field, hinting at their
external validity142,143.
Even though unexpected behaviors by AI agents can emerge8, their impact on humans’
ethical behavior largely depends on the way they are programmed and trained144. To assess the
corrupting effects of AI, future research needs to make difficult choices when it comes to
programming the AI agents used in experiments. AI agents can be programmed to follow a
specific objective function while humans often follow multiple goals, which are difficult to
change or predict145. Hence, the results of AI agents in these experiments will largely depend on
how the algorithms are programmed. If AI agents follow objective functions that merely
maximize financial payoffs, there is little reason to believe that it would abstain from breaking
unethical rules to achieve this goal. In fact, first simulations reveal that the same algorithm that
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achieves human-like cooperation levels in strategic games84 lies to the maximum extent when
placed in a collaborative cheating task. To enable transparent and reproducible research, we will
need an open and standardized protocol to use diversely calibrated algorithms as agents in
experiments146.
This methodological challenge echoes the broader technical challenge of how to avoid
algorithmic harm. Many fears about AI corrupting humans could be assuaged if algorithms
simply never caused harm37. For example, if we can make sure that algorithms never give
unethical advice, then we need not fear that humans be corrupted by this advice. The large
literature dealing with ethical AI and its alignment to human ethical value has made it clear,
though, that identifying, specifying, and programming human values into machines is a thorny
challenge147,148. One strategy proposes to train ML algorithms on desirable behavioral patterns,
rather than blindly opting for the largest datasets available for training144. Such efforts provide an
interesting point of departure to understand how people imitate or leverage machines into
unethical behavior.
Understanding is not enough, though. The next necessary step is to conduct
policy-oriented behavioral research149, particularly with a “focus on (...) AI-related social, legal
and ethical implications and policy issues” as the OECD recommends150. Anti-corruption
research20,151, AI safety research109,152, and policy guidelines150, alike point towards transparency
as a key policy to reduce potential harm. In particular, we need to investigate whether mere
knowledge about the existence of an algorithm, known as transparency about algorithmic
presence153, could alleviate its corrupting power. As algorithms become increasingly difficult to
detect with the naked eye56,119, researchers and policymakers have called for legal regulations that
demand AI agents to disclose themselves as such at the beginning of interactions154. Such
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knowledge about algorithmic presence likely shapes AI agents’ corrupting influence across all
the roles we considered in this article56,57,72. However, transparency can also create new tradeoffs,
for example, by undermining efficiency57. In any case, we need to know more about the
situations in which people actively seek out information about whether a fellow human or an AI
executes a given role and the situations in which they intentionally avoid such information, since
such strategic avoidance may nullify efforts toward transparency.
Another policy-relevant research question is how to integrate awareness for the
corrupting force of AI tools into the innovation process. New AI tools hit the market on a daily
basis. The current approach of “innovate first, ask for forgiveness later” has caused considerable
backlash155 and even demands for banning AI technology like facial recognition156. As a
consequence, ethical considerations must enter the innovation and publication process of AI
developments157. Current efforts to develop ethical labels for responsible AI158 or crowdsourcing
citizens’ preferences about ethical AI 132,159 are mostly concerned about the direct unethical
consequences of AI behavior and not its influence on the ethical conduct of the humans who
interact with and through it. A thorough experimental approach to responsible AI will need to
expand concerns about direct AI-induced harm to concerns about how machine behavior affects
the unethical behavior of humans.
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